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Civil Disobedience in the Civil Rights
Movement: To What Extent Protected
and Sanctioned?
I. INTRODUCTIONA LTHOUGH civil disobedience has only recently received wide-
spread public attention in the civil rights movement, it is not
a new experience in the history of America. From an early date the
revenue laws gave rise to violent resistance, first by the colonists
against tax laws passed by the English Parliament,' and then by citi-
zens of the United States against tax laws passed by both state and
federal governments.' Also, racial and religious convictions early
produced resistance to laws which conflicted with those beliefs.3
Later, the conflict between labor and capital gave rise to numerous
civil disorders.'
It is readily apparent that the dominant theme running through
the early civil disorders was violent resistance to law. This was evi-
denced in most instances by the use of federal troops to put down the
resistance and enforce the laws.5 Such conduct can be classified as
civil disobedience in the sense that it violates a system of ordered
laws, but it is also conduct that can find no constitutional protec-
tion or judicial sanction regardless of the ends it seeks or the un-
justness of the laws it resists. The judiciary has made this dear
through a long line of cases condemning violence.'
1. This resistance continued through the Stamp Act of 1765, and ended with the in-
famous tax imposed on colonial tea which gave rise to the "Boston Tea Party."
2. Examples include Shay's Rebellion which resisted customs laws imposed by Mas-
sachusetts, MINo'r, HISTORY OF THE INSURRECrION IN MASSACHUSEmrs (1810); the
Whiskey Insurrection which resisted a federal tax on the process of distilling. whiskey,
BALDWIN, WHISKEY REBELS (1939); Fries Rebellion which resisted real property and
slave taxes, DAVIS, THE FRIES REBELLION (1899); and the South Carolina nullifica-
tion ordinance attempting to void a federal tariff law, OGG, THE REIGN OF ANDREW
JACKSON (1919).
For comprehensive studies on other examples of mass resistance to law see RIcH,
THE PRESIDENTS AND Civn. DISORDiRS (1941); Office of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances, S. Doc. No. 263, 67th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1921-22).
3. SHEPHERD, HISTORY OF THE OBERLIN-WELLiNGTON RESCUE (1859); Office of
Judge Advocate General, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances, S. Doc. No. 263, 67th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1921-22).
4. See, e.g., ADAMIc, DYNAMrrE - THE STORY oF CLASS VIOLENCE IN AMERICA
(1931); McCABE, THE HISTORY OF THE GREAT RiOTS (1877); YELLEN, AMERICAN
LABOR STRUG.GLES (1936).
5. See note 2 supra.
6. See note 60 infra.
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Although civil disobedience is not new on the American scene,
the form of civil disobedience occurring in the civil rights movement
is a relatively new approach. It is a non-violent defiance of some
law or policy by persons who are attempting to challenge the valid-
ity of that law or policy, or are attempting to protest a wrong. There
is no attempt to conceal the violation; rather, the disobedient indi-
vidual is even willing and sometimes eager to submit to arrest and
punishment. Specifically, two methods are employed: sit-ins and
public demonstrations. While the sit-ins are generally conducted
on private property, public demonstrations in the form of marches,
meetings, and picketing are generally conducted on or near public
property. In the sense that this conduct violates law, it can also be
characterized as civil disobedience. However, it has been argued
that such conduct is not disobedience to law at all, but is an out-
growth of a system of federalism wherein a national policy of
equality for all people is asserted against a contrary state law;7 or
that it is in accord with a legal system affording individuals the op-
portunity to challenge laws;8 or that it is merely incident to the ex-
ercise of some constitutional right.
However these two methods are characterized, two questions
must be asked. Under what conditions and authority are their par-
ticipants protected from punishment under the laws they violate; and,
to what extent are these methods sanctioned, if at all, by the judi-
ciary' This Note is primarily devoted to a search for answers to
these questions through an examination of the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court,9 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
II. SIT-INS
A. Pre-Civil Rights Act
The particular cases reviewing convictions of sit-in demonstra-
tors decided prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 began in 1960
with Boynton v. Virginia," continued through the 1963 Sit-In
7. Black, The Problem of the Compatibility of Civil Disobedience with Amemcan In-
stitutons of Government, 43 TEXAS L. REv. 493, 500 (1965); see generally Keeton,
The Morality of Civil Disobedience, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 507 (1965)
8. Tweed, Segal & Packer, Civil Rights and Disobedience to Law: A Lawyers View,
36 N.Y.SB.J. 290, 291 (1964).
9. The decisions under review involve convictions under state laws of participants in
sit-ins and public demonstrations.
10. 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 1975 a-d, 2000 a-a(6), 2000 b-b(3), 2000
c-c(9), 2000 d-d(4), 2000 e-e(15), 2000 f, 2000 g-g(3), 2000 h-h(6) (1964)
11. 364 U.S. 454 (1960)
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Cases," culminated in the 1964 sit-in cases."3 In each case the
Supreme Court consistently ruled in favor of the demonstrators.
Factually, all of the cases involved persons who sought service in
private eating establishments which served the general public, but
followed a policy of refusing service to individuals solely because
of color. Upon the individuals' refusal to leave the premises at the
request of the owners or managers, they were arrested and convicted
under state trespass laws.
Thus, in the principal case in the 1963 sit-in cases of Peterson
v. City of Greenville,"4 the Court reversed the convictions of ten
Negro boys and girls finding a denial by the state of equal protec-
tion of its laws. The Court found "state action" in the use of the
state's trespass law to enforce the discrimination required by a Green-
ville city ordinance commanding segregation in restaurants, which
ordinance. in effect, removed the decision to segregate from the realm
of private choice. 5 Using the Peterson case as authority, the Supreme
Court took two additional steps in finding significant state involve-
ment in a restaurant owner's choice to follow a policy of segregation.
In Lombard v. Louisiana,'" although no ordinance commanding seg-
regation was involved, statements of a city official that sit-ms would
not be permitted were held to have the same effect as an ordinance
prohibiting such conduct. 7 Later,'in the 1964 Sit-In Cases, in Rob-
inson v. Florida,8 although no ordinance commanding segregation
or official pronouncement forbidding sit-ms was present, the tres-
pass convictions were nevertheless reversed because of the presence
of a Florida state agency policy of separate toilet facilities in restau-
rants and a similar Florida Board of Health regulation. The Court
reasoned that "while these Florida regulations do not directly and
expressly forbid restaurants to serve both white and colored people
together, they certainly embody a state policy putting burdens upon
12, Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 267 (1963); Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963) (per curiam); Gober
y. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963). (per curtain). Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262 (1963), was also decided on the same day. Mr. Justice
Harlan'p concurring opinion in Peterson and dissenting opinions in the other cases ap-
pear at 373 U.S. 248.
13. Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130
(1964); Bone v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Barr v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 146 (1964); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
14. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
15. Id. at 248.
16. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
17. Id. at 273.
18. 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
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any restaurant which serves both races, burdens bound to discourage
the serving of the two races together."' 9  It is clear from these
cases that if punishment of sit-in demonstrators can be initiated
by private discrimination and constitutionally enforced through state
trespass laws, it is permIssible only where the state has not coerced
or unduly influenced the private choice through laws and policies
commanding or advocating segregation m any manner. 0
In another of the 1964 Sit-In Cases, the Court upset the trespass
convictions of sit-in demonstrators where there was no evidence that
the state coerced or unduly influenced private choice. In Bell v
Maryland,21 the convictions were reversed and remanded to the
Maryland Court of Appeals to consider whether they should not be
vacated in light of a recently enacted state public accommodations
law prohibiting restaurants from denying service because of race.-
Although presented in prior cases, the Court again avoided the
question of whether the fourteenth amendment in itself prohibits a
state from supporting a private choice to segregate through the en-
forcement of its trespass laws. Four dissenting Justices felt that the
merits of the case should have been reached, 2  and they, along with
two members of the majority,24 expressed themselves on the ques-
tion. Including the three Justices who did not comment,2 a three-
way split resulted with three Justices viewing the fourteenth amend-
19. Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153, 156 (1964)
20. Cases involving state action similar to that found in Peterson, Lombard, or Robin-
son would today be decided on the authority of § 202 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
which provides that "all persons shall be free, at any establishment or place, from
discrimination or segregation [which] is or purports to be required by any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, rule, or order of a state or any agency or political sub-
division thereof." 78 Stat. 244, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 a(b) (1964)
21. 378 U.S. 226 (1964) The Court reversed trespass convictions in Griffin v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964), and Boue v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964),
finding respectively, a state denial of equal protection and a violation of due process.
Also, in Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964), trespass convictions were
reversed per curiam for reasons given in Boute.
22. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 241 (1964) Mr. Justice Brennan writing for
the majority went to considerable lengths to show that Maryland might very well reverse
the convictions by applying "the universal common-law rule that when the legislature
repeals a criminal statute or otherwise removes the State's condemnation from conduct
that was formerly deemed criminal, this action requires the dismissal of a pending crim-
inal proceeding charging such conduct." Id. at 230.
23. See the concurring opinion of Justices Douglas and Goldberg, Bell v. Maryland,
378 U.S. 226, 242 (1964), and the dissenting opinion of Justice Black in Bell v. Mary-
land, supra, at 318, in which Justices Harlan and White joined.
24. The Chief Justice and Justice Goldberg, while not wishing to reach the merits of
the case, did join to discuss the constitutional issue in Justice Goldberg s concurring
opinion in Bell v. Maryland, supra, at 286.
25. Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Clark joined in the majority opinion not reaching
the merits and did not offer or join in an opinion on the constitutional issue.
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ment as forbidding such an application of a state's trespass laws,"
and three taking a contrary position.27
B. After the Civil Rights Act
A great deal of the effect of the fourteenth amendment question
was rendered moot by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In Hamn v
City of Rock Hill," the Supreme Court, in a five to four decision,
reversed convictions under state trespass statutes against Negro demon-
strators for participating in sit-in demonstrations in the luncheon fa-
cilities of retail stores. The Court again found it unnecessary to pass
on the fourteenth amendment question and held that the intervention
of the Civil Rights Act abated the convictions. After finding that
the luncheon facilities involved were "public accommodations" with-
in the meaning of the act,2" and citing section 201 (a)3" giving the
right to equal enjoyment of those facilities, the Court held that the
language of section 203 (c), providing that "no person shall .
punish or attempt to punish any person for exercising or attempting
to exercise any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202,""
on its face prohibited prosecution of persons seeking service in a
covered establishment. 2 The convictions and the act's prohibition
of the application of state laws to deprive a person of rights granted
by it were in direct conflict and therefore held invalid under the
supremacy clause. Further, upon finding that the act prohibited
state or federal trespass convictions occurring after its enactment, the
only remaining question was the effect of the act on trespass
conviction judgments rendered before its passage, but not final-
ized because of appeals. This question was answered by finding
first that the act would abate all federal prosecutions under federal
law. The Court then reasoned that "it follows that the same rule must
prevail under the Supremacy Clause which requires that a contrary
26. The Chief Justice and Justices Douglas and Goldberg. See the concurring opinions
of Justice Douglas, Bell v. Maryland, supra note 25, at 242 and Justice Goldberg, Bell
v. Maryland, supra note 25, at 286.
27. Justices Black, Harlan, and White. See Justice Black s dissenting opinion, Bell
v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 318 (1964).
28. 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
29. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 201 (b), 78 Star. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 a-2 (c).
For a further discussion of the public accommodations section of the 1964 Act see Note,
Public Accommodatuons: A Justification of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 16
W Rs. L R~v. 660 (1965).
30. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 a-2(c) (1964); Hamn v. City of Rock Hill,
379 U.S. 306, 311 (1964).
31. Section 203 (c), 78 Star. 244, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 a-2(c) (1964)
32. Hamn v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 311 (1964)
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practice or state statute must give way."33  Each of the four separate
dissenting opinions had one objection in common with the majority
holding: none could find a "scintilla of evidence" in the act or its
legislative history to support the conclusion that Congress meant to
abate outstanding judgments of state courts.34
In defense of its convictions, the state argued that victims of
discrimination must use the act's exclusive remedies to challenge segre-
gation and not resort to such "extralegal" means as sit-in demonstra-
tions. The majority, however, refused to accept this argument;
rather, they interpreted the act as a defense not limited solely to in-
dividuals who pursue its statutory remedies.3 5 They reasoned that
although the law generally condemns self-help, the language
of § 203(c) supports a conclusion that non-forcible attempts to
gain admittance to or remain in establishments covered by the Act,
are immunized from prosecution for the statute speaks of exercis-
ing or attempting to exercise a "right or privilege" secured by its
earlier provisions.36
Justices White and Black strongly dissented from this position. Jus-
tice White answered that if Congress intended to ratify "massive
disobedience to the law," it would have done so in "unmistakable
language," and certainly he could find none in the act. In any
event, he concluded that the courts should not give "wholesale sanc-
tion" to non-violent disobedience to laws with which people dis-
agree."8 Justice Black also could not understand how the majority
interpreted the act as authorizing persons who are unlawfully re-
fused service a "right" to take the law into their own hands.3 9 On
33. Id. at 315. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented finding: the doctrine of criminal abate-
ment could not be applied to existing legislation of another jurisdiction; no evidence
in the act of Congress s intention to displace past as well as prospective application of
state laws; no evidence demonstrating how giving effect to past state trespass convictions
would result in placing a burden on present interstate commerce. Id. at 322-26. How-
ever, in a concurring opinion Justices Douglas and Goldberg could find no validity in
Justice Harlan s last objection stating that, "it is not difficult to see how Congress
could conclude that all state interference with the exercise of this right [fourteenth
amendment's right to be free from discriminatory treatment] should come to a halt on
the passage of the Act " Id. at 317
34. Justices Harlan, White, Black, and Stewart dissented.
35. Hamn v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 311 (1964).
36. Ibid. The Court also noted that "the legislative history specifically notes that
the Act would be a defense to criminal trespass, breach of the peace, and similar prose-
cutions," citing Senator Humphrey s speech. Id. at 311.
37 Id. at 328 (dissenting opinion).
38. lbd.
39. Id. at 318 (dissenting opinion)
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the contrary, he felt that the chief purpose of the act was to bring
disputes out of the streets and into the courts.4"
C. After Hamn
Two separate and distinct questions remain after the Hamn case.
First, granting that the Civil Rights Act protects sit-in demonstrators
from state prosecution under its trespass laws, the question then arises
as to what extent does it render moot the question of whether, absent
any state coercion or undue influence, the fourteenth amendment in
itself insulates demonstrators by prohibiting the state from enforcing
private choice by criminal conviction? Second, to what extent has
the Supreme Court by its language in Hamn sanctioned sit-in demon-
strations under the act?
(1) Fourteenth Amendment Questzon.-Before the fourteenth
amendment question can be avoided, the discriminating private estab-
lishment must be found to be a "public accommodation" within the
meaning of section 201 (b) of the act.4' Section 201 (b) makes it
clear that only certain establishments specifically listed" are within
the act, and then only if their operations "affect commerce," or if
their policy of discrimination or segregation is supported by "state
action" as those terms are defined by the act.43 Basically, section
201 (b) includes sleeping," eating, 5 and entertainment accommo-
dations,4" in addition to gas stations4 and those establishments in
close proximity to the expressly covered establishments. 4 Thus, if
an establishment is not one of those listed, or, if listed, neither affects
commerce nor derives support for its policy of discrimination or segre-
gation from state action, the Court must again face the constitutional
question.
40. Id. at 318-19.
41. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 a(h) (1964). Title II affords injunctive re-
lief against discrimination in places of public accommodation.
42. See § 201(h), 78 Star. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 a(h) (1964). The section
provides that, "each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place
of public accommodation within the meaning of this title if its operations affect com-
merce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action." (Emphasis
added.)
43. Sections 201(c)-(d), 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000 a(c)-(d) (1964).
"Affect commerce" is broadly defined by 5 201(c), and "state action" is broadly de-
fined by § 201 (d).
44. Secuon 201(b) (1), 78 Stat. 243,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 a(b) (1) (1964)
45. Section 201(b) (2), 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 a(b) (2) (1964)
46. Section 201 (b) (3), 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 a(b) (3) (1964)
47. Section 201 b) (2), 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 a(b) (2) (1964)
48. Section 201(b) (4), 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 a(b) (4) (1964).
1965]
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In the case of a listed establishment which is found not to affect
commerce, the Court may be forced to answer the fourteenth amend-
ment question, albeit through an interpretation of section 201 (d) "
Specifically, section 201 (d) (3) provides that "segregation is
supported by State action within the meaning of this title [Title III
if such segregation is required by action of the State. "5o
Thus, if a majority adopts the position of three Justices as expressed
in Bell v Maryland1 that state court enforcement of its trespass laws
in support of private discrimination amounts to state action, the es-
tablishment will be within the act. However, it should be noted
that three Justices took a contrary view in Bell. 2 In any event, be-
cause of the broad sweep of section 201 (d) defining state action
and because of the past reluctance by the Court to directly meet the
constitutional question, the probable case for the Court to directly
decide this question is one involving an establishment not listed in
the act. Admittedly, the act's coverage is broad, but the question is
not entirely moot.
(2) Sit-in Demonstration Sanctzon.-Norwithstanding the dis-
senting opinions of Justices White and Black in Hamn v City of
Rock Hill,53 the Court has sanctioned non-forcible sit-in demonstra-
tions conducted for the purpose of exercising or attempting to exercise
a right or privilege secured by the public accommodations section of
the act. However, two limitations are apparent in this statement. First,
although the Court cited legislative history in Hamn indicating that
the act was intended to be a defense to "criminal trespass, breach
of the peace and similar prosecutions,"54 it is improbable that a con-
viction of sit-in demonstrators under an ordinance respecting a
breach of the peace would be reversed in a case where the evidence
indicated violence or an immediate threat of violence on the part of
demonstrators or onlookers. From the language of the Hamn de-
cision, it appears that conduct which goes beyond "non-forcible at-
tempts" will not be tolerated regardless of the type of law under
which it is punished. Second, in basing its reasoning in Hamn on
the language of section 203 (c) of the act, the Court has limited
49. Section 201(d), 78 Star. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 a(d) (1964)
50. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 a(d) (3) (1964)
51. 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (concurring opinions of Justices Douglas and Goldberg)
See notes 24, 26 and accompanying text, supra.
52. See dissenting opinion of Justice Black, Id. at 318. See note 27 and accompany-
ing text, supra.
53. 379 U.S. 306, 318, 327 (1964)
54. Id. at 311.
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its sanction to cases involving establishments covered by the public
accommodations title since the language of section 203 (c) goes only
to a "right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202 [of Tide III." "
Thus, the trespass convictions of demonstrators conducting sit-ms in
establishments not covered by the act will be reviewed on the au-
thority of those applicable cases decided prior to the passage of the
act wherein no clear sanction exists.5" Although the convictions
were reversed in each of the above cases dealing with sit-in demon-
strations, and to that extent the Court tacitly sanctioned the conduct
of the demonstrators, it is still unclear whether trespass convictions
will be reversed in future cases not involving state involvement in
the private choice to discriminate.
III. PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS
As noted previously, the second method employed by the civil
rights movement is the public demonstration in the form of marches,
meetings, or picketing on or near public property. Like the sit-in
demonstration, this method often results in the violation of state
laws, such as breach of the peace ordinances, street and sidewalk
obstruction statutes, or statutes prohibiting courthouse picketing.
In addition to reversing the convictions of demonstrators under
these laws, the Supreme Court has set out the bounds wherein the
demonstrator may violate the laws and escape punishment.
A. Breach of the Peace
A number of the cases involving breach of the peace convictions
are brought to the Court with typical fact situations. Large numbers
of demonstrators (ranging from 100 to 2000 people) conduct
marches on, and meetings at, seats of government or courthouses
for the purpose of protesting some form of discrimination or draw-
ing public attention to their objectives, or both. During the march
or at its destination, the demonstrators stage songs, speeches, and
prayers. There is usually no violence or threat of violence from
either the demonstrators or the groups of onlookers that gather.
After refusing requests by city officials to disperse, one or more of
the demonstrators may be arrested, tried, and convicted under a
breach of the peace ordinance.
Where these facts exist the Supreme Court has uniformly re-
55. Section 203 (c), 78 Stat. 244, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 a-2 (c).
56. See notes 11-20 and accompanying text, supra.
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versed the convictions. In Edwards v South Carolina," for exam-
ple, the Court established that the fourteenth amendment does not
permit a state to make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopu-
lar views, and the mere fact that a possibility of violence from on-
lookers exists is not enough to warrant punishment. Second, the
Court has usually found the statute upon which the convictions were
based to be unconstitutionally vague on its face or in its interpreta-
tion. This result is reached because the broad scope of these laws
would allow persons to be punished for peacefully exercising their
first amendment freedoms of speech and assembly.5"
However, m each case the Court first looked to the record to de-
termine if actual violence or an immediate threat of violence was
present.5" If such conduct is present, it is clear that a breach of the
peace conviction would be sustained on a long line of authority hold-
ing that the first amendment freedoms are not absolutely immune
from state action reasonably designed to protect society.' In the
same vein, since picketing and congregating, although used to com-
municate ideas, are not pure speech and therefore not in themselves
protected by the first amendment, they may be regulated by narrow,
well-defined laws which are applied non-discrimmatorily 6  The
Court will not interfere with convictions based on conduct which
goes beyond the bounds of orderly, peaceful expression, or conduct
which transgresses valid breach of the peace laws.
B. Obstructing Public Passages
Public demonstrations often have the effect of partially or com-
pletely obstructing public passage in streets and on sidewalks. The
power of the state to regulate these public passages for the conven-
57 372 U.S. 229, 337 (1963) Convictions were also reversed on the same ground
in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776
(1964), Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963)
58. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 338 (1963), see also other cases cited in
note 57 supra. The typical interpretation of "breach of the peace" as used in the statutes
was given by the Louisiana Supreme Court which stated it meant, "to agitate, to arouse
from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet." Cox v. Louisiana,
supira note 57, at 551.
59. Justice Clark dissented in Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), find-
ing an "imminence of danger at every stage of [the] proceeding." Id.
at 244.
60. E.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)
61. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965); see also Justice Blacks concurring
opinion where he states that in his judgment a law prohibiting all crowds to congregate
or picket in streets, or a law narrowly drawn to prohibit such conduct under clearly
defined conditions is constitutional. Id. at 577
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ience and safety of the people cannot seriously be questioned. 2 But,
what of the civil rights demonstrator who violates a state law de-
signed to regulate these passages and is convicted thereunder? Un-
der what circumstances, if any, will that conviction be overturned
and the law allowed to be violated?
The recent case of Cox v. Lousana,63 provides some answers to
these questions. There, petitioner was convicted under a state stat-
ute prohibiting obstruction of public passages for his participation,
along with 2000 students, in a demonstration near a local court-
house." The Supreme Court reversed the conviction as a denial of
equal protection of the law because the "completely uncontrolled
discretion" of the local officials in applying and enforcing the statute
permitted discriminaton against the petiioner.65 The basis for the
reversal is not surprising since it is clear that a law vesting "un-
bridled discretion" in local officials to determine who shall dissemi-
nate ideas is unconstitutional; the situation in Cox amounted to the
same thing.68
In reversing, however, the Court emphatically rejected the argu-
ment that the first and fourteenth amendments afford the same free-
dom to those who communicate ideas by conduct such as marching
and picketing in streets, as the amendments afford to those who
communcate ideas by pure speech. Thus, the Court again recog-
nized that not "everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may ad-
dress a group at any public place and at any time," 7 and that a prop-
erly drawn statute giving limited discretion as to time, place, dura-
tion, or manner of use of streets and sidewalks for public assembly
is constitutional provided it is exercised with uniformity.68 In a dis-
senting opinion Justice Black went further in expressing the belief
that a statute forbidding all access to streets and other public facili-
ties for parades and meetings would be constitutional if uniformly
62. See e.g., Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Cox v. New Hamp-
shire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
63. 379 U.S. 536, 553 (1965).
64. The Louisiana statute provided that, "no person shall willfully obstruct the free,
convenient and normal use of any public sidewalk, street, highway providing how-
ever, nothing herein shall apply to a bona fide legitimate labor organization Id.
at 553.
65. Id. at 558. Justices White and Harlan dissented in the reversal of the conviction
for obstruction of public passages finding no evidence of discriminatory enforcement
of the statute by the local authorities. Id. at 591.
66. E.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939)
67. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965).
68. Id. at 558.
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applied. The majority, after formulating this question, refused to
pass on it.69
At the present it is questionable whether demonstrators would
be protected in resisting a law which prohibits all access to public
facilities. However, they clearly would not be protected in disre-
garding a uniformly applied law designed to promote the public con-
venience by regulating the tune, place, duration, and manner of pub-
lic demonstrations.
C. Picketng Near a Courthouse
The petitioner in Cox v. Loutsana,° was also convicted of violat-
ing a state statute prohibiting all picketing "in or near" a court-
house.7 The record showed that petitioner and the other demon-
strators were ordered by city officials to hold the meeting (which
was conducted for the purpose of protesting an earlier arrest of other
demonstrators and the evils of discrimination) a distance of 101
feet from the courthouse. Although in a separate opinion the Court
found the statute to be valid on its face, it reversed the conviction
because the statute as applied constituted a violation of due process.
Because the highest official of the city gave petitioner express per-
mission to hold the meeting 101 feet from the courthouse, he, in
effect, told petitioner that the meeting would not be "near" the court-
house within the terms of the statute; thus, a later conviction under
the statute was a violation of due process since it constituted a form
of entrapment.72
The conviction was reversed on the peculiar facts of the case,
but the opinion made it clear that resistance to uniformly applied
laws prohibiting demonstrations near courthouses would not be tol-
erated. In meeting the argument that the statute was unconstitu-
tional on its face the Court noted that it was modeled after an identi-
cal statute pertaining to the federal courthouses.73 On the basis of
the federal statute and past decisions there is no doubt that a precise
and narrowly drawn statute prohibiting all picketing in or near a
69. Id. at 557 (concurring in part and dissenting in part) The majority cited cases
in a footnote that would cast doubt on the validity of such a law. Id. at 555 n.13.
70. 379 U.S. 559 (1965)
71. The Louisiana statute provides: "whoever, with the intent of interfering with
the administration of justice, or influencing any judge pickets or parades in or
near a building housing a court" shall be in violation of the statute. Id. at 560. (Em-
phasis added.)
72. Justices Black and Clark separately dissented finding it impossible to justify re-
versing on such "subtle" ground. Id. at 575, 585.
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1507 (1958).
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courthouse is a proper exercise of the state's police power to protect
its judicial system from the pressure which such picketing might
create, and that persons who violate such a statute will not be al-
lowed to escape punishment. 4
D. A Final Note
Although the Supreme Court reversed the convictions of public
demonstrators in the above cases, it has dearly indicated the situa-
tions wherein it will allow such convictions to stand. In the last
paragraphs of the Cox opimon, as if to be a warning to future civil
rights demonstrators, the Court stated:
Nothing we have said here [courthouse picketing conviction]
or in [regards to the breach of peace and public obstruction
convictions] is to be interpreted as sanctionmg riotous conduct in
any ,form or demonstrattons, however peaceful thetr conduct or
commendable thenr motwes, which conflict with properly drawn
statutes and ordinances designed to promote law and order, pro-
tect the community against disorder, regulate traffic, safeguard
legitimate interests in private and public property, or protect the
admitnstration of justice and other essential governmental func-
tions. 7
Further, "there is a proper time and place for even the most peace-
ful protest and. a plain duty and responsibility on the part of all citi-
zens to obey all valid laws and regulations."76
74. Section 301 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizes the Attorney General
to institute action against a state for denying an individual equal utilization of any
"public facility" because of color. Basically, before the Attorney General can institute
such action he must find that the claimed denial of equal use of the facility is meritor-
ious, and that the individual is unable to initiate and maintain the action himself in
that he is financially unable, or that by doing so would jeopardize him personally. Al-
though the act itself does not define what is included within the term "public facility,"
the legislative history indicates that it is intended to cover three types of facilities: (1)
public parks, playgrounds, and like facilities, (2) those used in the administration of
justice, and (3) those suitable for use by demonstrators to petition and protest wrongs
such as streets and sidewalks. H.R. REP. No. 914, pt. 2, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 233, 270,
271 (1963).
It is doubtful that the public facilities section of the act will have the same effect
with respect to convictions of public demonstrators as the public accommodations sec-
tion had on convictions of sit-in demonstrators since the former section has no provision
similar to § 203 (c) prohibiting attempted punishment of individuals exercising or at-
tempting to exercise rights secured by the act. This is further borne out by the fact that
the Supreme Court did not mention the act in the cases of Cox v. Louistana, 379 U.S.
536, 379 U.S. 559 (1965), whereas in Hamn v. City of Rockhill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964),
the Court dealt with the effect of the act in depth. More importantly, however, the
public facilities section evidences the policy of the entire act of testing laws in the courts
rather than in the streets. This is demonstrated by that section s provisions aiding an in-
dividual who is faced with a discriminatory law and unable to challenge it in the courts.
Now, he need not violate the law to challenge its validity.
75. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574 (1965). (Emphasis added.)
76. buW.
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IV CONCLUSION
Historically, civil disobedience has been the object of judicial dis-
favor. But the civil disobedience associated with the civil rights
movement does find some protection and judicial sanction. Specifi-
cally, on the authority of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Supreme
Court has given an express, qualified sanction to sit-rn demonstra-
tions. Also, on the authority of the Constitution, the Court has
tacitly sanctioned certain public demonstrations by reversing the con-
victions of participants. In this respect the form of civil disobe-
dience witnessed today may be compatible with our legal system, al-
though that system normally does not condone self help.
There are, however, limitations, the most important of which
is that such, conduct, whether it be a sit-in or a public demonstration,
must be kept within the bounds of order; no matter what the
method, violence is always condemned. And within the bounds of
order, such conduct is limited by the state's power to regulate its
thoroughfares and protect its judicial process. Although the Su-
preme Court expressly sanctioned one method of civil disobedience
in Hamn v City of Rock Hill,7 that case, as well as other cases such
as Cox v Louzszana,8 demonstrate the limits of that sanction. How-
ever, it is hoped that the limited context m which this sanction was
given is recognized and not taken as a license for wholesale civil
disobedience.
EDWARD F MAREK
77 379 U.S. 306 (1964)
78. 379 U.S. 536, 379 U.S. 559 (1965)
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